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Classes From the Nice Despair


On this podcast, Motley Idiot senior analyst Invoice Mann discusses:

  • What he is watching available in the market.
  • The place he is been placing his cash to work and which shares he is been shopping for.
  • His relative disinterest in IPOs as an occasion.

Writer Morgan Housel joins Motley Idiot host Alison Southwick and Motley Idiot retirement knowledgeable Robert Brokamp to speak in regards to the speculative increase that induced the Nice Despair, and the way these classes apply to buyers at the moment.

To catch full episodes of all The Motley Idiot’s free podcasts, take a look at our podcast heart. To get began investing, take a look at our quick-start information to investing in shares. A full transcript follows the video.

This video was recorded on June 14, 2022. 

​​Chris Hill: At this time we have got Morgan Housel doing what he does finest: taking a look at monetary historical past and drawing classes for at the moment. Motley Idiot Cash begins now. I am Chris Hill and I’m joined by Motley Idiot senior analyst Invoice Mann. Thanks for being right here.

Invoice Mann: Hey, Chris, how’re you?

Hill: I might be doing higher if the market was going increased. However in that sense, I’ve a whole lot of firm, do not I? We might all be doing just a little bit higher [laughs] if the market was going increased.

Mann: Sure, precisely. I assume the excellent news is that you simply’re not essentially questioning what you have got finished flawed.

Hill: No, that’s true, so that’s some solace. I wished to get your ideas on simply stepping again. I imply, certain, we might discuss Oracle‘s earnings if you happen to actually wish to. However I am extra enthusiastic about Invoice Mann’s big-picture view of the place issues are proper now. As a result of one thing Jason and I had talked about yesterday was the extent of pessimism available in the market proper now. I do not wish to say it is unfounded as a result of when you have got good individuals like Jamie Dimon popping out and saying, I feel there’s an financial hurricane coming and the one query is how unhealthy it is going to be, and by the best way, we’ll be doing X, Y, and Z with our stability sheet. We’re going to be extra conservative. If there’s a whole lot of pessimism on the market, no less than it is grounded in one thing. Let’s keep on with pessimism for only one second. Do you have a look at the commentary? Do you have a look at the response and a few of the feedback from possibly not Jamie Dimon, however famous buyers? Do you suppose it is in keeping with your pondering? As a result of there are some individuals on the market saying, hey, look, that is unhealthy and I feel it is going to get quite a bit worse.

Mann: It is superb to me that you simply convey up Jamie Dimon in his feedback proper out of the gate as a result of Jamie Dimon joined a CEO roundtable. He is advised the story various instances in his early teenagers. One of many first issues that he did was, the CEO roundtable, all of them obtained collectively and talked about “What’s this subsequent yr going to appear to be?” Jamie Dimon went via the method and you’ll suppose that CEOs know greater than anyone else. He simply had some researchers return and say, OK, they’ve finished this for each single yr. Let’s return and see how correct they had been of their prognostications.

Chris, you wouldn’t be stunned to listen to that they weren’t very correct. They weren’t excellent at prognosticating, the individuals who you’ll suppose, and so they’re in a semi-private room. They don’t seem to be speaking to the general public; they’re speaking to one another. They don’t seem to be excellent about prognosticating. Now I have a look at what’s taking place now and sure, Jamie Dimon got here out and he mentioned “I see a hurricane coming.” He’s at a structurally vital bang-up monetary establishment. So sure, he sees the sheet music that is being handed to him. But when we had been higher at prognosticating, do you suppose that the S&P 500 would have solely been allotted 2% to vitality firms in 2021 if we had been good at seeing what was coming? We’re not. We’re not good at seeing what’s coming.

Hill: Sorry to get private, however are you doing something along with your money proper now? One thing Jason and I talked about yesterday was placing cash to work slowly. I will simply say in my very own monetary life earlier this yr when the market dropped, what I believed was a [laughs] respectable quantity, I checked out a few of the actually steady, sustainably worthwhile companies that their shares appeared like they had been on sale to me, and in some circumstances, they had been — firms like Microsoft and Johnson & Johnson, and Apple and that type of factor. I believed, OK, I will purchase some extra shares of these. To an organization, they’ve mainly fallen additional. I do not know. I am a type of individuals who’s like, I feel I am holding on to my money for proper now. What are you doing along with your cash?

Mann: I even have been investing. One factor that is actually vital to acknowledge is that the worth you pay is a type of threat. The upper the worth of any firm. If you should purchase it at $10 a share versus $20 a share, it’s primarily the identical firm. Should you purchase one thing at a better value, you’re primarily even when it would not really feel prefer it in the mean time, taking over extra threat. The inverse of that’s now, that you’ve firms which are down 60%, 70%, 80%. A few of them are dramatically the identical firms. A few of these firms ought to have by no means been priced as excessive as they had been and can most likely by no means come again. However what’s taking place proper now? Any individual who lives in an rising market can be very comfy with what’s taking place proper now, as a result of every part’s getting bought.

Each asset class, bonds are being bought, sovereigns are being bought, commodities are being bought, and shares are being bought. That’s one thing that folks in creating markets are very completely happy about, however they’re comfy with — that kind of indiscriminate promoting suggests to me that we should always in truth be trying on the different facet of the danger equation and purchase. I feel it is very easy for individuals to say, properly, the inventory’s down 90%, so subsequently it should be low-cost. A few of these firms are by no means coming again, however I’ve a tough time believing that Berkshire Hathaway, which I had purchased some a couple of weeks in the past, is actually that deeply impacted, or Mastercard, or Google, or Domino’s Pizza. These are firms which are unimaginable at creating wealth over the cycle, and information flash, we’ve got not cured the financial cycle. Over the cycle, these firms will proceed to make some huge cash. The final I checked, that is the purpose of investing.

Hill: It is Tuesday morning as you and I are having this dialog. I feel it is cheap to say that if not all eyes are on the Federal Reserve, most eyes are on the Federal Reserve, the assembly, and the probability of a charge hike coming later this week. Are you watching that, and if not, what are you watching to provide you a greater sense of the place the economic system goes within the close to time period?

Mann: I imply, I feel it is attention-grabbing what’s taking place, and what we’re going via proper now could be pretty unprecedented. In some methods proper now goes over the past decade. But in addition what’s taking place proper now could be, the final 4 days or the final six months, our economic system is clearly struggling, however we’re additionally seeing inflation. Often, when you have got an economic system that is struggling in the best way that ours is now, each United States and globally, the Federal Reserve or central banks are going to step in and add liquidity. However as a result of we have got an inflationary atmosphere and it’s harmful, they’re having to proceed to boost charges, which doesn’t bode properly for asset pricing. However asset pricing in the end on the finish of the day shouldn’t be the horse that leads the financial cart. I imply, it’s really the alternative. So for me, what we’re seeing proper now could be the backslide, not simply of two years of an unimaginable quantity of liquidity being put into the market however virtually 15 years, going again to 2008.

I imply, we have gone via a decade during which sovereign debt world wide in 2020, $17 trillion of it traded at a destructive charge, which meant that if you happen to held the debt, you paid for the privilege. That is previous to 2015. That was a unicorn sighting. So we’re popping out of what has been one of many strongest financial durations in world historical past, not simply our lifetimes. I am speaking a thousand years of precise centralized monetary programs. It simply bears remembering that whenever you come out of one thing that is bizarre, these bizarre issues are going to occur on the bottom. I have been shopping for shares.

I am not significantly convicted about it. Should you had been to inform me that the market was going to go down one other 40%, I might say, nah. Persons are on the market nonetheless spending six figures on a bizarre image of a monkey that is obtained some code behind it, so who actually is aware of? However I do know proper now that the Fed is preventing one thing that was a pure final result of some actual monetary stress, and on the finish of it, we are going to hit an equilibrium.

Hill: Very last thing, after which I will allow you to go. You had talked about that a few of these firms are usually not coming again. You and I’ve talked earlier than on this present in regards to the SPACs that simply littered the markets final yr and the yr earlier than. Actually, now we have a look at a few of them as public firms and suppose now, OK, yeah, you most likely should not have.

Mann: You had been a cash seize.

Hill: This was money-grabbing, and also you most likely haven’t any enterprise being within the public markets. I neglect who mentioned it, however I heard somebody say just lately that requested the query, the rhetorical query, who in God’s identify would go public on this atmosphere proper now? Are IPOs one thing that you simply have a look at as a constructive signal someplace, whether or not it is later this yr or into 2023, as a result of it actually does seem to be we went via a protracted stretch of time the place we did not actually collectively ask the query about any firm going public. Why are they going public? We simply thought, oh, OK, this is an organization going public. It looks as if, Invoice, we’re in an atmosphere proper now the place if an organization had been going public, that might be the very first thing we’d ask. Like, actually, you are going public now, on this?

Mann: The loopy factor is, I do not actually care that a lot about IPOs simply because I like them a lot. I feel I like a lot understanding how a administration crew goes to work together and behave as a publicly traded entity. I do not care what individuals say; it’s a wholly totally different expertise to have the public-facing you on a quarter-by-quarter foundation from whenever you had been a non-public firm. The factor is, Chris, there are tons of of SPACs which were stood up as buckets of cash that they’ve an egg timer, they should proceed to convey firms public. You are going to see extra firms come public. I really suppose that it’s a little bit extra of a target-rich atmosphere.

Now you may even see firms which are coming public via SPACs as a result of there’s a mutually agreed however not expressed desperation between the 2. [laughs] Like we’d like the cash, you have got the cash. Let’s do a factor and we’ll cope with the implications later. You are going to see extra firms come public. I have a tendency to think about instances just like the SPAC bubble, so many firms coming public. It’s a must to keep in mind that they are not doing that for the advantage of buyers. They’re doing it at a cut-off date during which it’s good for them. The truth that it’s a far more tough time to go public may very well imply that it’s a higher time to be on our facet of the ledger and be patrons of shares.

Hill: I am sorry, however your SPAC analogy simply instantly dropped at thoughts bartenders as final name, and two individuals simply have a look at one another and, all proper, [laughs] why do not we go house collectively?

Mann: [laughs] I am sorry. We have not been silly sufficient but, however there’s simply sufficient time.

Hill: Invoice Mann. All the time nice speaking to you. Thanks for being right here.

Mann: Thanks, Chris.

Hill: Within the wake of shares falling this yr, we determined to look again at different market crashes from historical past. A number of years again, Morgan Housel joined Alison Southwick and Robert Brokamp to speak in regards to the speculative increase that induced the Nice Despair and the way these classes apply for buyers at the moment.

Alison Southwick: Let me set this stage for you. It is the roaring ’20s. Within the wake of World Struggle I, the nation’s wealth greater than doubled. Which means that lots of people had sufficient cash to change into full-blown customers. They might purchase newfangled issues like electrical fridges and radios and, lest we neglect, the Mannequin T. On this affluent America you can have something, besides alcohol, after all. However the celebration did not cease. [laughs] Out of the blue. So at the moment, Morgan, becoming a member of us for our collection this month taking a look at market crashes within the U.S., and why not begin with the massive one, that nice crash, Black Tuesday. However earlier than we get into the precise crash, what was life like, main as much as the Nice Despair?

Morgan Housel: Each time individuals talked about what induced the Nice Despair, what induced the crash of 1929, it is all the time straightforward to level to 1 factor, however then what induced that one factor that you would be able to all the time hold going again in time and say what actually induced all this to occur. If we’re speaking in regards to the Nice Despair, I might like to begin with World Struggle I. One thing actually vital occurred in World Struggle I. Frederick Lewis Allen is a superb historian who wrote historical past within the Twenties and Thirties. He made this level that in World Struggle I, to finance the conflict, they bought liberty bonds to common on a regular basis Individuals, not simply rich individuals, however on a regular basis Individuals had been shopping for liberty bonds to finance the conflict. It was the primary time that almost all Individuals had any expertise with stockbrokers.

As a result of stockbrokers up till that time solely handled rich individuals and aristocrats, and now it was on daily basis skilled conductors and farmers stepping into and speaking to a inventory dealer to purchase these liberty bonds as a result of there’s such a push of patriotism to purchase these bonds. Due to that, not solely did individuals get their first style of what it was prefer to work at a stockbroker. However stockbrokers needed to study all types of latest expertise to promote to those common on a regular basis individuals and high-pressure gross sales ways had like a needle there in safety and get them to purchase one thing that they actually did not want.

However the salesmen’s job was to persuade them that you simply wanted this. It was arrange within the late nineteen-teens, this early dynamic of Primary Road’s affiliation with Wall Road that had no relationship earlier than that. That is the place I feel the seeds of the Nice Despair had been in the end planted getting on a regular basis individuals who did not have some huge cash and had no sophistication, no coaching or schooling, getting them concerned with Wall Road.

Southwick: However then that they had no place to get educated both.

Housel: Yeah.

Southwick: You are simply going to should belief this stockbroker man.

Housel: That is the primary seeds that had been planted, after which after World Struggle I, all of the troops got here house. Devastating interval for the conflict, and the economic system immediately falls into a extremely deep recession, actually unhealthy, excessive deflation, actually excessive unemployment within the early Twenties. Frederick Lewis makes this actually attention-grabbing level I feel that between the conflict after which the recession when individuals got here house, the individuals simply obtained bored with being drained after like seven years of every part going flawed. There was a interval within the early and mid-Twenties when individuals simply mentioned, I am able to have enjoyable once more. We have been coping with a decade of every part going flawed between conflict and the recession, I am able to let unfastened and have enjoyable once more. It was virtually just like the spark that he wrote about that within the early Twenties, individuals had been simply able to have enjoyable and simply let unfastened and some different issues occurred on the similar time.

That is actually vital main as much as the Nice Despair. Simply proceed on with the tales of actually terrible issues taking place. 1921, there was a extremely terrible famine in Russia, and america wished to do one thing about it. The U.S. authorities set an artificially excessive value for the worth of wheat and advised farmers as a lot wheat as they will develop, we are going to purchase it from you at this inflated value. The value of wheat on the time was, I feel $0.40 a bushel and the federal government mentioned, we are going to purchase as a lot as you may develop at a $1 a bushel in order that they will ship it to Russia to assist break the famine. You had all these farmers that in a single day mainly had been minting cash and planting as a lot wheat and corn as they may and making a fortune doing it by promoting it the federal government. It was so profitable to be a farmer again then throughout this time due to these inflated costs that that they had, what had been referred to as suitcase farmers, which had been individuals from Chicago and Minneapolis who had been, possibly they had been legal professionals or insurance coverage salesmen that might take the prepare into Iowa and purchase a small farm and develop wheat.

They arrive in with their suitcase. [laughs] Perhaps farmers on the weekend go house as a result of you may make a lot cash doing it. Farming was such a giant a part of the economic system again then that within the early Twenties when that began, it was simply an enormous stimulus to the general economic system. This huge farming surplus was happening. On the similar time that you simply had those who had been simply able to get again into having enjoyable and serving to develop the economic system once more and so it was like virtually in a single day within the early Twenties, the US economic system simply took off like a rocket ship. A part of that was popping out of this recession within the early Twenties and then you definitely mix that with this huge farming stimulus and it was simply increase off to the races. Due to the psychology on the time, Frederick Lewis Allen writes quite a bit about this on the time. That these individuals had been so able to have enjoyable once more that you simply combine that pleasure with that a lot extra cash that was flowing round it was only a increase time within the Twenties and also you combine optimism with some huge cash and other people begin making actually unhealthy selections. [laughs]

Robert Brokamp: [laughs] Then if you happen to additionally add in debt, as a result of lots of people did not have essentially all the cash to purchase these new shopper items or these investments, however there have been individuals who had been prepared to lend on cash to do this. Again then, the margin requirement to borrow cash to purchase investments was solely 10 %, so if you wish to purchase a thousand {dollars} value of inventory, you solely must put down 100 bucks. All that factor needed to do is drop 10 % and then you definitely’ve misplaced all of the fairness in that funding.

Housel: Additionally throughout this era in Twenties, two of I feel an important innovations of the twentieth century, the automobile and the radio, had been coming on-line for common on a regular basis individuals and that simply added to the sense of optimism of what we might do as a rustic, what our potential was. That utterly modified American life within the span of some years, the automobile and the radio. You then add all that collectively, you have got individuals who for the primary time ever have connections to stockbrokers. You’ve this huge financial increase from farming.

Then you have got all this optimism coming from the airplane and the Twenties making lots of people know the booming twenties or roaring twenties. It was a good time for lots of people that simply led to a whole lot of pleasure and over-optimism and so led to within the late Twenties, most likely the most important inventory bubble that we have ever seen. That actually happened in identical to a yr or two, is actually like 1928 and early 1929 that the market simply went straight up, simply went parabolic and day after day after day inventory costs for all firms had been simply going straight up and elevated by a number of multiples simply within the late Twenties to create a bubble that, it is onerous to measure it as a result of earnings and whatnot weren’t measured again then, however most likely a lot greater than the 1999 inventory bubble, simply utterly indifferent from actuality by 1929.

Southwick: Let’s get to the precise bursting of the bubble.

Housel: What’s attention-grabbing too is that it did not occur in sooner or later. We discuss in regards to the crash of 1929, however that performed out over per week and is mainly three days in October of 1929 when the market fell about 12% every day consecutively. I feel placing that collectively, somewhat than all taking place without delay, having it unfold out just a little bit, gave buyers on the time, I do not suppose it was requested traumatic as we’d count on it to be at the moment as a result of it occurred slower than say, the crash of 1987. It simply performed out slowly and other people had been so accustomed to prosperity and rising inventory costs that the 30 % decline that occurred in October. Was it a giant deal? In fact.

Did stockbrokers bounce out the window? Actually, sure, there have been accounts of that occuring. However I feel individuals had been so shocked and a 30% decline within the grand scheme of issues, is not that massive? In three days, it is huge, but it surely’s not that huge a deal, inventory costs fell 20 % within the US in 2011. There was nonetheless a reasonably large sense of optimism on the time and Herbert Hoover who was President and Andrew Mellon, who was Secretary of Treasury on the time, made a giant push within the media and newspapers to say, enterprise is sound, the basics are sturdy, it is a short-term break, as they referred to as it again then, however we’ll pull via this, every part is OK and I feel individuals purchased it on the time. Because the month stored enjoying out into November and December of 1929, issues stabilized and recovered just a little bit and the massive thought was, that was it, that was robust, however issues are going to maneuver on and issues are going to maintain going. There’s just a little little bit of a rally after that, however individuals actually had no thought what was nonetheless to return.

Southwick: Apparently sure, so what was nonetheless to return and the way are we going to undergo right here?

Housel: Even by mid-1930, most economists thought by trying round and what was taking place, that we had been in a fairly unhealthy recession, however nothing greater than that. A fairly extreme recession however nothing of historic phrases. It was the summer season of 1930 and as we moved into 1931 that the banking system began cracking, which was induced quite a bit by two issues. One, all these buyers with margin debt who had been shopping for from banks, had been now defaulting on the debt that they had been borrowing. But in addition, wheat costs and corn costs began plunging, so then farmers who had been a giant driver of the financial increase of the Twenties and had leveraged up with all debt to purchase farm tools whatnot had been defaulting at report charges too. Again then, the Federal Reserve labored otherwise.

They did not bail out banks like they do at the moment and extra importantly, the massive factor was there was no FDIC insurance coverage, so in case your native financial institution was happening, your life financial savings was going with it. That started the financial institution runs of the early Thirties, which is the place issues actually began getting out of hand. It peaked in 1932 and there was beginning a wave of financial institution failures in 1932 and the massive one really was a financial institution in Austria referred to as Creditanstalt in Vienna, that was an enormous financial institution in Austria and it failed in a single day and nobody actually noticed it it coming. There have been some economists who’ve mapped this, the way it occurred. After Creditanstalt failed in Vienna, then it unfold to Paris after which unfold to London after which ultimately unfold to New York. There was a financial institution referred to as the Knickerbocker Belief in america that failed in New York and after that, the curtain simply got here down.

Southwick: Knickerbocker, that is like essentially the most good identify for a failing financial institution in Twenties [laughs].You could not write that.

Housel: After the banks began failing, that is the place issues began getting actually ugly in america. Now we’re into 1932, so we’re three years after the crash of 1929, which I feel, to me that is most likely the most important false impression of the Nice Despair, is that there was a crash in 1929 after which increase, welcome to The Nice Despair and it wasn’t. The primary couple of years performed out slowly over a interval of a few years. If you consider the 2008 monetary disaster, the worst of that was actually contained in actually a 90-day interval. In late 2008, September, October, and November after which it was just about over. The Nice Despair performed out over three years and what I feel did the alternative of what the Twenties did, is that folks simply obtained accustomed to pessimism. Their hope vanished, after you’ve got simply been overwhelmed up persistently for 3 years, individuals simply lose all their optimism and all their religion. That feeds on itself, as a result of if companies and workers, and buyers have no optimism, and have no confidence, then it is actually onerous to get them.

Southwick: Nothing goes up.

Housel: The inventory market bottomed in mid-1932. Unemployment within the economic system bottomed in 1933, 4 years after the crash.

Southwick: How can we get better? How can we get out of this?

Housel: That is the place issues might get political and lots of people nonetheless disagree with this 90 years later, however Franklin Roosevelt is elected in 1932 and began with the brand new deal. There’s that component of it, of financial stimulus from the brand new deal, simply altering ways and whatnot. There’s additionally a factor with all recessions that if costs get low sufficient, inventory costs, housing costs, labor costs, if issues get low sufficient, then it is engaging to get again in enterprise. Each funding, each enterprise alternative is engaging at some value and costs obtained ridiculous low and Thirties in all places, the worth of labor, the worth of meals. By 1932, inventory costs had been down 89% from their 1929 peak, so simply utterly obliterated. However there are nonetheless a whole lot of good firms on the market.

Southwick: You talked in regards to the FDIC. Did that come out of this? What different laws or regulation got here out following the despair to maintain this from taking place once more? As a result of it is clearly by no means going to have an once more.

Housel: [laughs] Not going to let it.

Southwick: No, it is solely going to occur over the following three episodes of this podcast. Not this unhealthy, after all.

Housel: The few huge ones in addition to FDIC Insurance coverage, one was the SEC and a whole lot of the explanation that the market grew so excessive within the Twenties, is as a result of fraud and unhealthy habits within the inventory market was speedy. One of many huge actors in the course of the Twenties who made a fortune ripping individuals off within the inventory market was Joseph Kennedy, JFK’s father. He made a fortune within the Twenties, bringing collectively teams of buyers after which they’d nook a inventory and put out false data and since that they had a nook, they may drive up the worth after which as soon as an increase in costs obtained different individuals excited, then they’d dump their shares again on them. There was all this misbehavior within the inventory market. That was completely authorized again then, although they had been actually making the most of susceptible individuals. With that got here the SEC and the punch line of the story is, you understand who the primary chairman of the SEC was? Joseph Kennedy.

Southwick: Similar man. [laughs]

Brokamp: What was FDR’s quote about that?

Housel: I neglect.

Brokamp: One thing alongside the traces, if you wish to catch a financial institution robber, you bought to place him in cost, [laughs] one thing alongside these traces.

Housel: That was the opposite huge factor in addition to the FDIC, was the SEC.

Southwick: As we’re winding down right here, what’s your takeaway for buyers? What’s one good lesson from The Nice Despair that our listener ought to takeaway?

Housel: There’s a lawyer throughout The Nice Despair named Benjamin Roth, who stored a extremely unimaginable diary. He was a lawyer, however he was an newbie investor too and an newbie economist, a extremely good man. His son revealed the biography, I feel 5 years in the past. It is referred to as The Nice Despair. A Diary. It is actually fascinating simply to see a layman’s notion of what occurred in the course of the despair. He consistently writes about 1932, and 1933 he makes use of the identical phrasing again and again. He says, “Everybody is aware of shares are low-cost however no person has any money to purchase them.” He simply talked about it far and wide. He says not simply shares, he is speaking about buildings and actual property and his neighbourhood. There is a warehouse down the road that is promoting for nothing, however no person has any money to purchase it.

He writes in regards to the sense of, all this chance that is misplaced and if anybody had any money throughout that interval, they will mint a fortune. There was simply a possibility laying proper in entrance of them, however nobody had any money saved up. To me, I used to write down a weblog proper about this fairly a bit, after I was right here at The Motley Idiot. Individuals actually low cost money as an asset, when issues are going properly. Money would not earn an excellent return. Why would you wish to earn money? Put your cash to work, it is not doing something for you. The worth of money is what it might probably do for you when issues flip down and issues ultimately will, that is what you earn your return on money and so I’ve all the time held more money than I feel any monetary advisor would say is important, however that is why I do it and I feel I am incomes an excellent return on my money, I am simply not going to comprehend that return till issues get bushy once more.

Hill: As all the time, individuals on this system could have an curiosity within the shares they discuss that The Motley Idiot could have formal suggestions for or in opposition to, so do not buy or promote shares primarily based solely on what you hear. I am Chris Hill. Thanks for listening. We’ll see you tomorrow!



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